Linux auditd: New user account creation via useradd (ADD_USER/SYSCALL)
Flags Linux auditd evidence of new local user accounts created using useradd.
- Product
- linux
- Service
- auditd
- Author
- Marie Euler, Pawel Mazur (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-05-18
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
PersistenceRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies creation of a new local user account by correlating auditd events where a useradd-related syscall is recorded and an ADD_USER record is present. Attackers may use newly created accounts for persistence without needing remote access tools. The detection relies on Linux auditd telemetry containing SYSCALL events whose executable path ends with /useradd and corresponding ADD_USER audit records.
Reporting behind it
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/security_guide/sec-understanding_audit_log_files
- access.redhat.comhttps://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2
- youtube.comhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmvY5SQm5-Y&ab_channel=M45C07
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/auditd/syscall/lnx_auditd_create_account.yml
Changelog
v3- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Linux auditd: New user account creation via useradd (ADD_USER/SYSCALL)"
id: d63e3ac1-2ff4-43f7-894f-3d7cb144bb43
status: test
description: This rule identifies creation of a new local user account by correlating auditd events where a useradd-related syscall is recorded and an ADD_USER record is present. Attackers may use newly created accounts for persistence without needing remote access tools. The detection relies on Linux auditd telemetry containing SYSCALL events whose executable path ends with /useradd and corresponding ADD_USER audit records.
references:
- https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/security_guide/sec-understanding_audit_log_files
- https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmvY5SQm5-Y&ab_channel=M45C07
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/linux/auditd/syscall/lnx_auditd_create_account.yml
author: Marie Euler, Pawel Mazur, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-05-18
modified: 2022-12-20
tags:
- attack.t1136.001
- attack.persistence
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
selection_syscall_record_type:
type: SYSCALL
exe|endswith: /useradd
selection_add_user_record_type:
type: ADD_USER
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Admin activity
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512
type: derived