Linux doas Command Execution Identified

Flags Linux executions of the doas utility based on process image path ending with /doas.

FreeReviewedSigma · Low · v3
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
Sittikorn S, Teoderick Contreras (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-01-20
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process executions of the doas utility on Linux systems by matching process image paths that end with /doas. doas enables non-root users to run commands with elevated privileges, making its use a key step in privilege escalation workflows. Detection relies on process creation telemetry that includes the executed image path.

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Changelog

v3
  1. v3
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  3. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.