macOS Emond Launch Daemon Rule Install Monitoring via plist and emondClients Paths

Alerts on macOS Emond rule plist or emond client database changes that may indicate persistence setup.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2020-10-23
Updated
2026-07-31
title: macOS Emond Launch Daemon Rule Install Monitoring via plist and emondClients Paths
id: 118e64fc-c78b-4a86-939c-78dc33e82807
status: test
description: This rule flags file creation or modification events involving macOS Emond configuration files placed under /etc/emond.d/rules/ with .plist extensions, as well as changes to /private/var/db/emondClients/. Adversaries can use Emond launch daemon rules to establish persistence and potentially trigger actions that lead to elevated privileges. The detection relies on file event telemetry capturing TargetFilename values for these specific directories and filename patterns.
references:
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.014/T1546.014.md
  - https://posts.specterops.io/leveraging-emond-on-macos-for-persistence-a040a2785124
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/macos/file_event/file_event_macos_emond_launch_daemon.yml
author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1546.014
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: macos
detection:
  selection_1:
    TargetFilename|contains: /etc/emond.d/rules/
    TargetFilename|endswith: .plist
  selection_2:
    TargetFilename|contains: /private/var/db/emondClients/
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administration activities
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 23c43900-e732-45a4-8354-63e4a6c187ce
    type: derived