macOS Process Discovery via ioreg I/O Kit Registry Queries

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
- T1082System Information Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of macOS ioreg to collect I/O Kit registry and system-related information. Attackers may use ioreg output to enumerate hardware, virtualized environments, or device details as part of system reconnaissance. It relies on process creation telemetry, matching image paths ending in ioreg and command-line arguments that include common ioreg options and target class/vendor strings.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1082 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious macOS Hardware Identifier Reconnaissance via ioreg (via process_creation)

Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Host Reconnaissance via Get-ComputerInfo via ps_script

Suspicious Host Recon via ConvertFrom-Csv and ConvertTo-Json

Suspicious Java Process Spawning Reconnaissance Commands via Cleo MFT (via process_creation)

Suspicious Reconnaissance Commands Spawned by Samsung MagicINFO Server

Suspicious macOS Download History Query via sqlite3

Suspicious Security Policy Export via SecEdit (via process_creation)

macOS Process Discovery via ioreg I/O Kit Registry Queries

Pivot detection · T1082 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

macos-process-monitoring-for-i-o-kit-registry-discovery-via-ioreg-2d5e7a8b

title: macOS Process Discovery via ioreg I/O Kit Registry Queries
id: b6c13c04-e9b9-4a33-a42c-42a5cb184abb
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of macOS ioreg to collect I/O Kit registry and system-related information. Attackers may use ioreg output to enumerate hardware, virtualized environments, or device details as part of system reconnaissance. It relies on process creation telemetry, matching image paths ending in ioreg and command-line arguments that include common ioreg options and target class/vendor strings.
references:
  - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0373d78db6c3c0f6f6dcc409821bf89e1ad8c165d6f95c5c80ecdce2219627d7/behavior
  - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4ffdc72d1ff1ee8228e31691020fc275afd1baee5a985403a71ca8c7bd36e2e4/behavior
  - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5907d59ec1303cfb5c0a0f4aaca3efc0830707d86c732ba6b9e842b5730b95dc/behavior
  - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_ph/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_ioreg_discovery.yml
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-12-20
modified: 2024-01-02
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1082
logsource:
  product: macos
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: /ioreg
    - CommandLine|contains: ioreg
  selection_cmd1:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -l
      - -c
  selection_cmd2:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - AppleAHCIDiskDriver
      - IOPlatformExpertDevice
      - Oracle
      - Parallels
      - USB Vendor Name
      - VirtualBox
      - VMware
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative activities
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 2d5e7a8b-f484-4a24-945d-7f0efd52eab0
    type: derived

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This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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