Malicious Abyss Locker wmihelper SSH Backdoor Deployment (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the Abyss Locker persistence backdoor, an SSH client wrapped as a service under the Microsoft WMI application data directory together with its private key and service configuration. The actor installed this component as a service named WMI Helper Agent using a service wrapper to maintain covert reverse tunnel access. These paths are not associated with legitimate WMI functionality.

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Malicious Abyss Locker wmihelper SSH Backdoor Deployment (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.