Malicious Active Directory Honeypot Enumerated by a Suspicious Host - Bloodhound (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-07
Updated
2026-11-07

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects is attempting to discover sensitive accounts using tools like Bloodhound. To find out the source of the enumeration, correlate the SubjectLogonId from ID 4662 with TargetLogonId from ID 4624.

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Malicious Active Directory Honeypot Enumerated by a Suspicious Host - Bloodhound (via security)
Pivot detection · T1087 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.