Malicious Active Directory Replication Request Indicating DCSync

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a directory service access event granting the replicating directory changes right which the ALPHV actor exercised through a credential tool to perform DCSync and pull domain hashes and this matters because outside of domain controllers and a small set of sync services the request for the replication extended right is a high fidelity indicator of DCSync credential theft.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.006 — drag to rearrange
Malicious DCSync Domain Replication Credential Theft (via process_creation)
Malicious Exchange Group Membership Change to Perform DCsync Attack (via security)
Suspicious Computer Account Password Reset via net user by UNC1549
Malicious Replication Privileges Accessed to Perform DCSync Attack (via security)
Windows PowerShell: DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount Enumeration
Windows Process Creation: Detect Mimikatz Tool and Module Command-Line Usage
Windows Security: AD object replication attempted by non-machine account (Event ID 4662)
Windows System Service Execution of Credential Dumping Tools (Service Control Manager Event 7045)
Windows Security EID 4697 Service Execution of Credential Dumping Tools
Malicious Active Directory Replication Request Indicating DCSync
Pivot detection · T1003.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.