Malicious APT15 Persistence via Nwsapagent Service or Run Key Registry Value

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registry modifications that register APT15 persistence under the Nwsapagent name in either a service key or an autorun Run key. Observed in NCC Group research on APT15 RoyalCli and RoyalDNS which persist via a Nwsapagent service and Run key. Masquerading persistence under a plausible service name is a hallmark of this espionage group.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious APT15 Persistence via Nwsapagent Service or Run Key Registry Value

Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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