Malicious Arkanix Stealer C2 Communication via Custom User-Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-10
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic carrying the hardcoded User-Agent string used by the Arkanix C++ and Python infostealer. Kaspersky observed Arkanix identifying itself to its panel with the ArkanixStealer client string while requesting stealer and hidden VNC modules. This distinctive agent is a reliable indicator of an infected host communicating with the stealer backend to receive payloads and exfiltrate credentials.

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Malicious Arkanix Stealer C2 Communication via Custom User-Agent
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.