Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an account being added to a privileged Azure AD directory role such as Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator, an account-manipulation technique used to escalate and entrench control of a tenant. Privileged role assignment is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report cloud coverage. Detecting this operation surfaces privilege escalation in the identity plane.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.003 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Entra Cross-Tenant Access or External User Invitation via Azure Audit (via azure)
Suspicious Delegated Permission Grant to Entra Agent Access Scope via Azure Audit Logs
Suspicious IAM CreateLoginProfile For Root User via AWS AssumeRoot Abuse
Suspicious AWS IAM Privilege Escalation via AttachUserPolicy of Administrator Policy
Suspicious Member Added to Privileged Directory Role in Entra ID
Suspicious High-Privilege Microsoft Graph Application Role Grant via Azure Audit (via azure)
GCP Google Workspace: Application ContextAwareAccess Setting Changed
GitHub Audit: Outside Collaborator Membership and Permission Changes
Azure Audit Logs: Admin-initiated App Role Assignments and Privileged Delegated Permissions
Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.