Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an account being added to a privileged Azure AD directory role such as Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator, an account-manipulation technique used to escalate and entrench control of a tenant. Privileged role assignment is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report cloud coverage. Detecting this operation surfaces privilege escalation in the identity plane.

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Malicious Assignment of a Privileged Azure AD Role (via auditlogs)
Pivot detection · T1098.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.