Malicious AzureHound Cloud Reconnaissance via User Agent (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-18
Updated
2026-10-18

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects sign-ins and Graph API activity carrying the azurehound user-agent string, indicating use of the AzureHound collector to enumerate users, groups, roles, and service principals. Threat actors run AzureHound to map Azure and Entra ID attack paths before privilege escalation. Detecting the tool user-agent exposes cloud discovery activity at its source identity.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.