Malicious BADIIS Driver Dropped to System32 Drivers Directory (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-16
Updated
2026-09-16

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the BADIIS malicious kernel driver payloads being written into the System32 drivers directory under masquerading filenames. Observed in Elastic Security Labs analysis of the global SEO poisoning campaign where WUDFPfprot.sys, WppRecorderpo.sys, and WppRecorderrt.sys are dropped to establish a stealthy foothold.

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Suspicious Service Creation Named RDP-Controller via sc.exe (via process_creation)
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Malicious BADIIS Driver Dropped to System32 Drivers Directory (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.