Malicious BitLocker Abuse for Ransomware via PowerShell (via ps_script)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
ps_script
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell that enables BitLocker while removing the key protectors which the ShrinkLocker ransomware does to encrypt drives and lock out the legitimate owner without leaving a recovery key.

Related detections9 linkedT1486 — drag to rearrange
Possible Akira Ransomware Note or Encrypted Extension Creation
Malicious Storm-2603 Ransom Note File Creation
Possible Ransomware Note or Encrypted File Extension Creation
BitLocker Feature Activation on Multiple Hosts - Native (via bitlocker)
FunkSec Ransomware Encryption Artifacts via funksec Extension and Markdown Ransom Note (via file_event)
INC Ransomware Ransom Note INC-README Written to Disk (via file_event)
Malicious DEVMAN Ransomware Encrypted File and Note Artifacts
Malicious Akira Ransomware Encrypted File Extension via File Event
Malicious WeaXor Ransomware Encryption Artifacts on Disk (via file_event)
Malicious BitLocker Abuse for Ransomware via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Pivot detection · T1486 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.