Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering via bcdedit [Intel471] #2

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-05
Updated
2026-10-05

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects bcdedit.exe used to delete boot entries or force Safe Mode via safeboot, a defense-evasion and recovery-inhibition technique used by the Iranian-aligned Handala group ahead of destructive impact. Removing boot options or rebooting into Safe Mode disables security tooling and hampers recovery. Legitimate use of bcdedit delete or safeboot outside troubleshooting is rare.

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Suspicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC or PowerShell (via process_creation)
Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via bcdedit (via process_creation)
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Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering to Disable Recovery via BlackSuit Ransomware
Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering via bcdedit [Intel471] #2
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.