Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering via bcdedit (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-23
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects bcdedit commands that disable recovery options or manipulate boot configuration to support pre-OS persistence. DragonForce abuses bcdedit as part of a UEFI bootkit workflow and to inhibit Windows recovery, ensuring the compromise survives reboot and hampering remediation.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.