Malicious BRICKSTORM C2 over WebSocket to Cloudflare Workers Domain (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects WebSocket connections to a workers.dev subdomain used by the BRICKSTORM backdoor for command-and-control. Following Ivanti exploitation the actor tunneled BRICKSTORM traffic through Cloudflare Workers infrastructure to reach compromised vCenter hosts. Outbound wss traffic to attacker-registered workers.dev endpoints is a distinctive C2 indicator.

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Malicious BRICKSTORM C2 over WebSocket to Cloudflare Workers Domain (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.