Malicious Browser Credential Theft via rundll32 Loading move.dll (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Interlock custom infostealer move.dll executed through rundll32.exe with a start argument, a DER key file and a target host to collect browser credential stores. The stolen data is written per host as a CSV file. This rundll32 invocation of move.dll with a key file is characteristic of the stealer.

Related detections9 linkedT1555 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Data Exfiltration via curl Multipart Upload to Gate Endpoint
Suspicious ALPHA SPIDER Veeam Backup Credential Extraction (via process_creation)
Malicious User Files Dump via Network Share - DonPapi, Lazagne (via security)
Malicious User Application Credentials Dump via Network Share - DonPapi, Lazagne (via security)
Malicious Veeam Credential Theft via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Credential Harvesting via LaZagne (via process_creation)
Suspicious Credential Prompt Phishing via osascript (via process_creation)
Suspicious Credential Store Access for WinSCP and PuTTY via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Veeam Credential Extraction via sqlcmd Query (via process_creation)
Malicious Browser Credential Theft via rundll32 Loading move.dll (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1555 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.