Malicious BRUSHLOGGER Rundll32 Execution from ProgramData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-19
Updated
2026-09-19

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32 loading the BRUSHLOGGER Recorder.dll from the attacker's ProgramData staging directory. Observed in Elastic Security Labs analysis where Recorder.dll under a Photoes Pics path is executed to capture keystrokes from financial services targets.

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Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.