Malicious Bumblebee DLL Sideload of msimg32 by consent from Non-System Path (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the trusted Windows consent binary loading an msimg32 DLL from outside the System32 directory, the DLL-sideloading technique that launched Bumblebee from a trojanized ManageEngine installer in the Akira intrusion. Adversaries place a malicious msimg32 next to a signed binary so their loader runs under a trusted process, so a consent process loading msimg32 from a user or program path is a strong sideloading indicator.

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Malicious Bumblebee DLL Sideload of msimg32 by consent from Non-System Path (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.