Malicious C2 Communication via M-RED-TEAM User Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic carrying the hardcoded M-RED-TEAM user-agent tag used by the AsyncAPI supply-chain implant for command-and-control. The distinctive agent string identifies beaconing from the compromised host. This constant is tool-specific and rarely appears in legitimate traffic.

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Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.