Malicious Chisel Reverse SOCKS Proxy Execution (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-24
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command-line arguments consistent with a Chisel reverse SOCKS proxy client, tooling deployed by Turla during TinyTurla-NG operations. The reverse tunnel exposes internal hosts to attacker infrastructure and enables pivoting through the compromised network.

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Suspicious Chisel SOCKS Tunnel Command Line
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Suspicious SOCKS Proxy Autorun Registry Persistence via Registry Set
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Malicious Chisel Reverse SOCKS Proxy Execution (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.