Malicious Chrome Extension Sideload via --load-extension from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-12
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Chromium-based browser launched with the --load-extension flag pointing to a user-writable AppData or Public directory. The Ducktail campaign drops a malicious extension into the Chrome User Data folder and injects it through a LNK shortcut using --load-extension to steal session cookies and hijack business accounts, so this command line indicates unauthorized extension loading.

Related detections9 linkedT1539 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Browser Launch with Unpacked Extension Loaded via load-extension (via process_creation)
Malicious GenAI Browser Extension C2 and PAC Redirection (via proxy)
Suspicious Chrome Launch With Remote Debugging via Airstalk (via process_creation)
Malicious VVS Discord Stealer Script Drop via injection-obf.js (via file_event)
Suspicious Anonymous Sharing Link Creation in SharePoint or OneDrive via M365 Audit
Suspicious Microsoft Edge Headless Launch with Unpacked Extension via SNOWBELT (via process_creation)
Suspicious Browser Remote Debugging Port Cookie Theft via process_creation
Suspicious Browser Extension Force-Install via Registry (via registry_set)
Suspicious CloudScout hxkz_zip Exfiltration Archive Creation via File System
Malicious Chrome Extension Sideload via --load-extension from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1539 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.