Malicious Cloud Storage Destruction by Cloud Build Service Account

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
gcp
Service
gcp.audit
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects a Google Cloud Build default service account invoking storage bucket or object deletion which was abused to destroy data by triggering builds that ran attacker controlled steps. Destructive storage operations originating from a cloudbuild or compute default service account rather than a human principal indicate potential data destruction through the Cloud Build pipeline.

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Malicious Cloud Storage Destruction by Cloud Build Service Account
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.