Malicious Cloudflared Tunnel Execution via Cloudflared

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the cloudflared client to run a named tunnel with an embedded token, providing attackers covert command and control and remote access through Cloudflare infrastructure. This technique was observed in bulk RMM-driven intrusions against MSP customers where actors established persistent tunnels prior to Akira ransomware deployment. Detecting it early exposes attacker C2 egress that bypasses perimeter controls.

Related detections9 linkedT1219 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious SSH Reverse Tunnel via Renamed plink Utility on Triofox Host
Suspicious OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel Establishment via ssh.exe
Malicious Cloudflared Tunnel Established with Token
Suspicious Octo Tempest Remote Access and Tunneling Tooling (via process_creation)
Suspicious RMM Tool Execution from Windows Temp Directory
Silent AnyDesk Remote Access Tool Installation
Possible Gamaredon C2 via Ephemeral Tunneling and Worker Services
Suspicious Quick Assist Remote Tool Launched by Explorer via Nimbus RAT Lure
Suspicious NetSupport client32 Execution from User Writable Path
Malicious Cloudflared Tunnel Execution via Cloudflared
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.