Malicious COM TypeLib Hijack via Persistence CLSID Registration

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-11
Updated
2026-10-11

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registration of the TypeLib COM object CLSID {EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} which corresponds to the Internet Explorer browser control abused for stealthy persistence. The CPU-Z watering-hole campaign hijacked this TypeLib to reload attacker code whenever the component is instantiated as reported by Kaspersky. Writing to this TypeLib registry path is a known COM hijacking persistence and defense-evasion technique.

Related detections9 linkedT1546.015 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious COM TypeLib Hijack via Persistence CLSID Registration
Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.