huntrule

Malicious Command Output Written to SMB Named Pipe

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-28
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a command shell echoing data into a local named pipe object which the Dagon Locker actor used as a Cobalt Strike SMB beacon communication channel and this matters because writing to a raw named pipe from a shell is characteristic of beacon linking and post exploitation tasking rather than any legitimate scripting.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1021.002 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Network Share Manipulation via Commandline (via process_creation)
Suspicious Number of Oustanding SMB Requests Increased (via process_creation)
Suspicious SMB Insecure Guest Authentication Activated - Native (via security)
Suspicious PSexec Execution Over SMB Share (via security)
Suspicious Permissions Modification on a Network Share (via security)
Malicious Impacket Atexec Remote Scheduled Task Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Lateral Movement by Mounting a Network Share - Net Use - Command (via security)
Malicious Remote Shell Execution via SMB Admin Share (via security)
Suspicious Lateral Movement Detection - Based on "special Groups" Feature (via security)
Malicious Command Output Written to SMB Named Pipe
Pivot detection · T1021.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.