Malicious Consent to Known Traitorware Mail Clients via Azure AD

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-27
Updated
2026-09-27

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects tenant consent grants to the eM Client and SuperMailer applications abused as traitorware in the Huntress Microsoft 365 compromise. Attackers register these legitimate desktop mail apps as service principals to retain covert access to victim mailboxes, so consent to them in an unmanaged tenant is a strong persistence signal.

Related detections9 linkedT1078.004 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Bapak AWS EKS CreateCluster With Known Cluster Name via CloudTrail
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Malicious Consent to Known Traitorware Mail Clients via Azure AD
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.