Malicious Context.ai OAuth Application Authorization by Client ID (via google_workspace)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
google_workspace
Service
google_workspace.token
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Discovery

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Google Workspace token authorization events for the malicious OAuth application client_id used in the Context.ai compromise to reach downstream customer Workspace data. An authorize event for this client_id indicates a user granted the attacker application access and their tokens should be revoked.

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Malicious Context.ai OAuth Application Authorization by Client ID (via google_workspace)
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.