Malicious Context.ai OAuth Service Principal by App Owner Organization (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID activity referencing the attacker tenant owner organization id tied to the malicious OAuth application in the Context.ai supply-chain token compromise. A service principal owned by this organization present in your tenant indicates the malicious third-party app has been consented to and can access resources.

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Malicious Context.ai OAuth Service Principal by App Owner Organization (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.