Malicious Data Exfiltration via MinIO Client from Windows Temp

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
- T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the MinIO client with a config directory placed under Windows Temp as vmware.x combined with the insecure recursive copy flags used by the SnapMC actor to exfiltrate stolen data to attacker object storage. The masqueraded config path with TLS verification disabled is a strong indicator of automated bulk exfiltration.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1567.002 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Data Exfiltration via MinIO Client from Windows Temp

Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

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