Malicious Data Exfiltration via S5cmd to S3

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the s5cmd client copying local data to an S3 bucket, a high-throughput exfiltration path to attacker-controlled cloud storage. This was catalogued among data-exfiltration LOLBIN binaries. Bulk copying of internal files to S3 indicates staging for double-extortion.

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Possible Gamaredon Dead-Drop C2 via Telegraph and GoFile Web Services
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Malicious Data Exfiltration via S5cmd to S3
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.