Malicious DCSync Credential Dumping Tooling via Command Line (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command lines invoking known DCSync implementations such as the mimikatz lsadump dcsync module or impacket secretsdump. These tools request directory replication to extract account password hashes from a domain controller. Recovering domain hashes including krbtgt enables golden ticket forgery and full domain compromise.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.006 — drag to rearrange
Malicious DCSync Domain Replication Credential Theft (via process_creation)
Malicious Exchange Group Membership Change to Perform DCsync Attack (via security)
Suspicious Computer Account Password Reset via net user by UNC1549
Malicious Active Directory Replication Request Indicating DCSync
Malicious Replication Privileges Accessed to Perform DCSync Attack (via security)
Windows PowerShell: DSInternals Get-ADReplAccount Enumeration
Windows Process Creation: Detect Mimikatz Tool and Module Command-Line Usage
Windows Security: AD object replication attempted by non-machine account (Event ID 4662)
Windows System Service Execution of Credential Dumping Tools (Service Control Manager Event 7045)
Malicious DCSync Credential Dumping Tooling via Command Line (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1003.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.