Malicious DDoSia Client C2 Check-In via Fixed User-Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-26
Updated
2026-10-26

ATT&CK techniques

C2 → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects the NoName057(16) DDoSia client registering with its C2 by POSTing to a /client/login endpoint using a hardcoded legacy Gecko User-Agent. The combination of that outdated User-Agent string and the login path identifies the DDoS bot fetching its target list.

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Malicious DDoSia Client C2 Check-In via Fixed User-Agent
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.