Malicious Desktop Window Manager Impersonation From Non-System Path via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-08
Updated
2026-10-08

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process named dwm.exe running from a location other than the Windows system directories which indicates masquerading and likely process hollowing. SilentCryptoMiner hollowed a legitimate dwm.exe host to run its XMRig payload while evading defenders. The genuine Desktop Window Manager only ever runs from System32 so any other path is highly suspicious.

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Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.