Malicious ESX Admins Domain Group Creation via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of or membership changes to a domain group named ESX Admins using net.exe, the core exploitation step for CVE-2024-37085 in which ESXi hypervisors grant full administrative access to any member of that group. Multiple ransomware operators created this group to obtain hypervisor admin rights and mass-encrypt virtual machines.

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Malicious ESX Admins Domain Group Creation via Process Creation
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.