Malicious ESXi Syslog Redirection to tmp via esxcli

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-20
Updated
2026-10-20

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects reconfiguration of the ESXi syslog log directory to a volatile tmp location via esxcli. This behavior matches Akira ransomware operators targeting VMware ESXi who redirect logs to erase forensic evidence before encrypting virtual machines. Pointing syslog at tmp destroys audit trails and is a defense evasion step tied to hypervisor-level ransomware attacks.

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Malicious ESXi Syslog Redirection to tmp via esxcli
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.