Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination via esxcli Before Encryption

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-01
Updated
2026-11-01

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects use of esxcli to forcibly kill running virtual machine processes on an ESXi host. RTM Locker ransomware enumerates and then force-kills all VMs with esxcli vm process kill -t=force before encrypting datastore files. Mass forced termination of virtual machines is a hallmark of Linux and ESXi ransomware preparing to maximize impact.

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Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)
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Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination via esxcli Before Encryption
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.