Malicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wevtutil clearing Windows event logs, an anti-forensics action used to erase traces of intrusion activity. This was observed during KawaLocker ransomware deployment alongside firewall and shadow copy tampering. Wiping logs removes the primary evidence responders use to trace attacker actions.

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mass Windows Event Log Clearing via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Wmi (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Cleared Using Diagnostics - Via PowerShell (via powershell)
Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil During Ransomware Activity
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Get-WinEvent ClearLog (Qilin)
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil on EC2 Host
Malicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.