Malicious FalseFont Backdoor Run Key Persistence from AppData (via registry_set)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Priv Esc
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Run key persistence value pointing to a host.exe or broker.exe binary under an AppData path, the autostart mechanism the FalseFont backdoor uses to survive reboots. FalseFont is attributed to the Curious Serpens espionage actor, and running these implants from a user writable directory via a Run key is a clear sign of established backdoor persistence.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious FalseFont Backdoor Run Key Persistence from AppData (via registry_set)

Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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