Malicious Federation Trust Modification for Golden SAML Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Entra ID audit events that add or change domain federation settings, the control-plane action SolarWinds intruders used to establish Golden SAML persistence by trusting attacker-controlled token signing. Modifying federation trust lets an adversary forge SAML tokens for any user, so unexpected changes are a high-severity identity persistence indicator.

Related detections8 linkedT1606.002 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Octo Tempest Credential Theft Tooling (via process_creation)
Suspicious UNC3944 Rogue Federated Identity Provider Added to Entra Tenant (via azure)
Malicious Storm-0558 Forged Token Sign-In from MSA Consumer Tenant (via azure signinlogs)
Malicious Active Directory Federated Trust Added (via office365)
Malicious Octo Tempest Federation Persistence via AADInternals (via ps_script)
Microsoft 365 Audit: New Federated Domain Added
Malicious Federation Trust Modification for Golden SAML Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Pivot detection · T1606.002 · 8 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.