Malicious File Copy via Esentutl Volume Shadow Access (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects esentutl.exe invoked with the /vss switch to copy a locked file such as ntds.dit or a credential database from a volume shadow copy, a credential-access technique that sidesteps file locks. Esentutl shadow-copy abuse is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting this invocation surfaces theft of protected credential material.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction via Ntdsutil (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via ntdsutil IFM (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Database Staging to Audit Directory (via file_event)
IFM Creation Detected from Commandline - Installation from Media (via process_creation)
Malicious Credential Hive Copy from Volume Shadow Copy
Malicious NTDS Extraction via NetExec (via process_creation)
Malicious Active Directory Database Dump via ntdsutil IFM (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM Media Creation
Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction via ntdsutil IFM Snapshot (via process_creation)
Malicious File Copy via Esentutl Volume Shadow Access (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1003.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.