Malicious Fileless JavaScript Execution via Deno Data URI (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Deno runtime executing an inline base64 encoded JavaScript payload passed as a data application javascript URI, a fileless execution technique used by attackers abusing alternative runtime environments to evade disk based detection. The allow all flag combined with an inline data URI is a strong indicator of malicious in memory code execution.

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Malicious Fileless JavaScript Execution via Deno Data URI (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1059.007 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.