Malicious FIN7 DiceLoader C2 via Placeholder User-Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-22
Updated
2026-09-22

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command-and-control traffic carrying the literal placeholder user-agent myUserAgentHere, left hardcoded in the FIN7 DiceLoader beacon to cdn*.space infrastructure. No legitimate software presents this developer placeholder string, making it a high-confidence C2 indicator. It surfaces active FIN7 post-exploitation communication.

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Malicious FIN7 DiceLoader C2 via Placeholder User-Agent (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.