Malicious FIN7 DiceLoader C2 via Placeholder User-Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-22
Updated
2026-09-22

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command-and-control traffic carrying the literal placeholder user-agent myUserAgentHere, left hardcoded in the FIN7 DiceLoader beacon to cdn*.space infrastructure. No legitimate software presents this developer placeholder string, making it a high-confidence C2 indicator. It surfaces active FIN7 post-exploitation communication.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
IDAT Loader Connectivity Check via Short racon User-Agent (via proxy)
Suspicious CoffeeLoader C2 Beacon With Spoofed iPhone User-Agent (via proxy)
Suspicious TransferLoader C2 User-Agent Strings (via proxy)
Malicious C2 Communication via M-RED-TEAM User Agent (via proxy)
Suspicious Bash Reverse Shell via Dev TCP Redirection
Malicious TeamPCP antv Backup C2 Domain m-kosche (via dns_query)
Malicious Axios npm Compromise C2 Beacon to sfrclak and callnrwise (via dns_query)
Malicious TeamPCP durabletask C2 git-service and m-kosche (via dns_query)
Possible PowerShell Empire Default C2 URI Beaconing
Malicious FIN7 DiceLoader C2 via Placeholder User-Agent (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.