Malicious Fire Ant Hypervisor Backdoor Artifacts on ESXi and vCenter (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of file artifacts associated with Fire Ant persistence on ESXi and vCenter systems, including a Python HTTP backdoor and a listening implant along with extracted trust certificates. These specific paths correspond to backdoors deployed beneath the hypervisor to maintain covert access and are not part of a standard VMware installation.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.