Malicious Forced BitLocker Encryption for Extortion (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-10
Updated
2026-10-10

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects forced BitLocker volume encryption via manage-bde or the Enable-BitLocker cmdlet, the impact stage of the printer-and-BitLocker extortion scheme that encrypts victim disks for ransom. Attackers weaponize the built-in BitLocker feature to lock out victims without deploying custom ransomware, so unexpected encryption activity warrants investigation.

Related detections9 linkedT1486 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin
Malicious CACTUS Ransomware Note and Encrypted File Artifacts (via file_event)
Malicious Macaw Ransom Note or Encrypted File Written (via file_event)
Suspicious Executable Execution from PerfLogs Directory via process_creation
BlackCat ALPHV Ransomware Execution With access-token Argument
Malicious Akira Ransomware Ransom Note Creation
Malicious INC Ransomware Ransom Note Creation
Malicious INC Ransom Ransom Note File Creation
Malicious Hunters International Ransomware Encryptor Execution via Distinctive CLI Flags (via process_creation)
Malicious Forced BitLocker Encryption for Extortion (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1486 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.