Malicious FRP Reverse Proxy Tunnel Identified by Hardcoded Token (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-21
Updated
2026-10-21

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the hardcoded FRP authentication token frpforzhangwei used by CL-UNK-1068 to establish fast reverse proxy tunnels into victim networks. This unique token constant identifies the actor's tunneling infrastructure, providing persistent encrypted access for command and control and lateral movement.

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Suspicious ngrok Tunnel Setup via Authtoken or Service Install (via process_creation)
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Malicious FRP Reverse Proxy Tunnel Identified by Hardcoded Token (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.