Malicious GPO Logon Script Planted in SYSVOL Group Policy Path

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a batch or script file inside the Group Policy user logon scripts path which the IcedID to Dagon Locker actor used to abuse a domain GPO for organization wide code execution at logon and this matters because writing a logon script into the Group Policy scripts folder can execute across every affected user and is a powerful domain wide deployment mechanism.

Related detections9 linkedT1484.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Logon Script Written to SYSVOL Share via Group Policy (via file_event)
Suspicious Group Policy Client-Side Extension Attribute Modification via Directory Service Change
Suspicious Modification of a Sensitive Group Policy - GPO (via security)
Suspicious Group Policy File System Path Redirection via Directory Service Change
Malicious GPO Permission Abuse via SharpGPOAbuse
Suspicious Executable Launched from SYSVOL Share
Malicious SharpGPOAbuse GPO Modification Tool from Public Directory
Suspicious Permissions Changed on a Group Policy - GPO (via security)
Suspicious Executable Launched from Domain Netlogon Share (via process_creation)
Malicious GPO Logon Script Planted in SYSVOL Group Policy Path
Pivot detection · T1484.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.