Malicious Hidden Local Account via Winlogon SpecialAccounts UserList

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-05
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects modification of the Winlogon SpecialAccounts UserList registry key which hides a local account from the Windows logon screen, a defense-evasion technique used alongside AnyDesk abuse to conceal an attacker-created administrator account. Writing to this key is almost never legitimate and indicates deliberate account hiding.

Related detections9 linkedT1136.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious Hidden Local Account via SpecialAccounts UserList
PowerShell Local Account Creation With Self-Deleting Script
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Malicious Hidden Local Account via Winlogon SpecialAccounts UserList
Pivot detection · T1136.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.